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area of automated theorem proving. Even if you are already familiar with [l], you 
will find many new ideas. In particular the coherent treatment of both logical and 
implementation issues should make this book attractive for a wide audience. If you 
don’t have access to Cambridge LCF, the preface tells you how to obtain it free of 
charge. 
Tobias NIPKOW 
MIT Laboratory for Computer Science 
Cambridge, U.S.A. 
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1. Overview 
The primary purpose of this book is to give a formal semantics for the Z notation. 
The first chapter introduces the language by means of a short example, discusses 
the reasons for providing a formal semantics and the problems arising from ‘meta- 
circular’ definitions. It compares Z with VDM and with algebraic specification 
techniques. 
Chapter 2 identifies the semantic domains, and Chapter 3 provides the abstract 
syntax and the semantic mappings. 
Chapter 4 offers an enhancement o the semantics to support generic definitions, 
discusses apparent instances of referential opacity, alternative treatments of partial 
functions, and the relationship between Z and Clear. 
The final chapter discusses four further topics of interest. Proof rules for some 
of the operations of the schema calculus are provided and are shown to be sound 
by reference to the semantics. A method is shown for consistently introducing new 
types, illustrated by the natural numbers. The relationship between specifications 
and implementations is discussed, as is the need for non-determinism. 
A summary of notation is provided, which appears to cover the variant of Z used 
as a metalanguage, and an index of definitions is conveniently condensed onto two 
facing pages. 
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2. Analysis 
The book does not claim to be an introduction either to Z or to techniques for 
formally defining the semantics of specification languages. It is therefore suitable 
primarily for readers having some prior acquaintance with both topics. Domain 
theory is not a prerequisite. The author does take care to explain and illustrate his 
techniques before applying them to the problem. 
By addressing a subset of the language the complexity of the formal semantics 
has been contained, and a reader not previously expert in formal semantics might 
therefore benefit from a careful reading of the book. Readers without knowledge 
of Z will however find some difficulty, since Z is itself the meta-language in which 
the semantics is defined. 
The book does not claim-to provide a standard semantics for the Z notation. The 
metalanguage and the object language used in the book are distinct variants of Z, 
neither of which fully corresponds with other recently available Z documentation. 
2.1. Is a formal semantics the way to understand Z? 
An understanding of the semantics of a language depends not merely upon 
successfully identifying what each construct in the language denotes, but also upon 
an appreciation of the properties enjoyed by these denotations. These properties 
are needed for reasoning about specifications. It might be argued, that the primary 
purpose of a formal semantics, is to enable the derivation or justification of proof 
rules. Derivation of proof rules is a substantial task, in default of which the merits 
of the semantics must remain sub-judice. 
The author does provide some proof rules derived from his semantics in section 
5.1, these are illustrative and cover schema conjunction, schema disjunction and 
schema projection. Very little discussion is provided of the proof theoretic con- 
sequences of the main body of the semantics. 
2.2. Does the book define the semantics of Z? 
The semantics of Z is defined using (a different variant of) Z itself, supplemented 
in parts by a Plotkin style ‘structures operational semantics’. The author makes no 
attempt to conceal the difficulties arising from this approach, putting rather more 
vigour into identifying the pitfalls than into explaining how they are avoided. 
Nevertheless his analysis of the problems is incomplete. He observes that a meta- 
circular definition of the semantics of a programming language will have a trivial 
least-fixed-point, and may have several significantly different non-trivial fixed-points. 
He does not attempt to identify or eliminate any ambiguities which arise in this way. 
While clearly aware of some of the special considerations which apply to expressive 
specification languages, he does not acknowledge that these prevent the intended 
semantics from appearing among the fixed points. This can however be established 
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from the use of the axiom of regularity in defining the world of sers which is the 
principal semantic (co-)domain. 
The author is probably correct in claiming that his semantics could be rendered 
directly in first order set theory without the use of Z as a metalanguage. But in 
asking the reader to accept this he calls for an act of faith on the part of the reader, 
and begs a question which the formal semantics of Z might have been expected to 
settle more conclusively. 
Nevertheless, the meta-circular semantics will most probably be more accessible 
to the intended readership than a semantics written directly in first order set theory. 
Passing over the small number of trivial errors in the formal semantics there still 
remain a number of issues which justify discussion about whether the semantics 
defined is or should be the semantics of Z. 
2.3. Discussion points 
2.3.1. Conservative xtensions 
The semantics given makes it clear that there is in Z no requirement that 
specifications should be conservative extensions of the basic language. This has the 
undesirable consequence that specifications cannot be shown consistent without 
resort to the metalanguage, and that giving structure to such a consistency proof is 
made more difficult. A semantics could have been given in which extensions are 
either conservative or content free, and within such a semantic framework proof 
rules could be established enabling consistency proofs to be conducted in a well 
structured way in the object language. The practical disadvantages of the semantics 
in this respect are substantial for any user who needs to show his specifications 
consistent, and for tool developers who wish to provide support for the construction 
of consistency proofs. 
2.3.2. Schema negation 
The semantic domains chosen for schemas do not admit a rendering of the 
semantics of schema operations which faithfully reproduces previous informal 
accounts. The effects upon the semantics of schema negation (not noted by the 
author) seems most unsatisfactory and is illustrated by the following example. 
The negation of the schema: 
FUN 
f:N%N 
P 
where P is some desired property, on the basis of previous informal accounts would 
be: 
FUN 
f:N%N 
1P 
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but according to the formal semantics it will be: 
FUN 
f: P(N X N) 
i(function fA P) 
This is because the information contained in the signature of the schema over 
and above the type of the names (in this case the fact that ‘f’ must be a functional 
relation) is merged in the denotation with the information in the body of the schema 
(in this case P). 
2.3.3. The axiom of choice 
The author clearly has reservations about the axiom of choice and has taken steps 
to ensure that the axiom is not necessary. 
(i) “p”, previously described as the choice operator and given the full force of 
the classical choice function in draft rules of reasoning, has now been cut 
back to an operator of ‘definite description’. 
(ii) global generic definitions are required to be definite rather than loose. 
That the choice function has been discarded is probably a good thing. The require- 
ment that generic definitions should not be loose seems to be unnecessary and 
undesirable. Unnecessary, because the semantics does not depend, contrary to the 
author’s claim, upon the axiom of choice. It is true that the consistency of some 
loose generic specifications can only be shown using the axiom of choice. But any 
loosening of a tight specification could be proven consistent without the axiom, and 
hence so could any implementable loose specification. 
Even if the author were correct in claiming that the axiom of choice is necessary 
to give a semantics to loose global generic definitions, the cure seems worse than 
the illness. Disallowing looseness forces overspecification, and might make an 
implementation of a data type incompatible with the Z library for wholly trivial 
reasons. It also makes proofs more difficult by imposing further proof obligations. 
On the other hand, adverse consequences of admitting the axiom of choice are 
difficult to identify. Objections to it seem to be of a philsophical rather than practical 
nature. 
2.3.4. Partial functions 
The treatment of partial functions falls between the sort of treatment necessary 
in first order set theory and those advocated for the VDM specification language. 
In first order set theory every term must be assigned a value in the domain of 
quantification of each interpretation. A choice must be made in defining function 
application about what value should result when a function is applied to a value 
outside its domain. The primitive predicates (equality and membership) are total; 
classical first order logic is used without modification. 
In the VDM literature, application of a function outside its domain of definition 
does not yield a value in the domain of quantification, predicates may be partial, 
and the logic is three valued. 
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In Spivey’s semantics terms do not necessarily denote values in the domain of 
quantification, but the logic remains boolean. All predicates are ultimately formed 
from the equality and membership predicates, each of which will yield true or false 
even if its arguments are undefined. Undefinedness is therefore eliminated in the 
construction of formulae from terms. 
In his semantics Spivey assigns the value false to the equality or membership 
predicates when either of their arguments is undefined. The motivation behind this 
choice is not explained, nor its consequences. The author clearly finds equality thus 
defined insufficient for his own purposes. He defines in the metalanguage a strong 
equality, “z”, yielding true when applied to two undefined terms. This is used 
extensively in defining the semantics, but is not present in the object language. 
This treatment of partial functions results in the need for side conditions on 
specialisation of universally quantified formulae. Before a specialisation can take 
place, the term to which specialisation is proposed must be shown defined. 
The axiom of reflection continues to hold, e.g.: 
I-Vx:N-x=x 
applying the everywhere-undefined partial function over natural numbers to a natural 
number will always yield an undefined term of type N: 
k-(0: N%N)lEN 
which by Spivey’s semantics will not be equal to itself, hence: 
1-1(01= 01) 
Showing that specialisation of the law of reflection to the well types term “01” 
cannot be permitted. 
This is likely to make proofs more difficult than they would otherwise be. 
3. Conclusions 
This book sets a new standard in rigour of definition for the Z specification 
language. I hope that it does not prove to be the last word on the semantics of Z, 
but it does represent a very considerable improvement over previously available 
literature on this topic. The author has made a serious and careful attempt to put 
the semantics of Z on a sound basis, and students of the Z language will find this 
book a valuable aid in understanding Z. 
Roger BISHOP JONES 
ZCL Defence Systems 
Winnersh, Berkshire, 
United Kingdom 
